Research
| 10.01.2016
Design of Debt Covenants and Loan Market Conditions
When a debt covenant is violated the lender has the right to demand immediate repayment of the loan. Using this right, the lender can extract certain concessions from the borrower (manager), which may be inefficient. I propose a theory that explains why, despite this inefficiency, tight and often violated debt covenants may be optimal. In a repeated moral hazard problem combined with an incomplete contract set-up, the debt overhang prevents the manager from exercising optimal effort. I deviate from the standard incomplete contract set-up by allowing outside market participants to observe the uncontractable outcome. I model the manager's outside option as the opportunity to refinance his debt on a competitive loan market. In this situation, the market independently evaluates the manager's performance based on observable parameters. The value of the outside option has an important impact on the covenant design. A strict covenant will severely punish the manager if his outside option is low. If the covenant is violated the lender will have control over the manager's assets and the manager will face a renegotiation game in which the lender has all the bargaining power. In this case a high outside option allows the manager to retain some rents. The manager will exercise effort to increase his chances to have a high outside option.
| 31.12.2015
Unemployment insurance as a tool of social protection
This paper analyzes the international experience of functioning unemployment insurance systems and possibility of their application in Belarus.
| 31.12.2015
Maternity Support Programs in Belarus
This paper analyzes the effects of child-care leave and maternity capital policies, and provides recommendations for Belarus.
Pension System of Belarus: Current State and Necessity for Reforms
This paper shows that the pension system of Belarus must be reformed and proposes the most effective reforms among all available alternatives.
31.12.2015
Economic Crisis in Finland
This paper analyzes the main stages, causes and consequences of the economic crisis in Finland in 1990-1993. Financial deregulation in the 1970s and 80s has created conditions for credit expansion, growth of asset prices, short-term capital inflow, and expansion of domestic credit and currency speculations. The economic crisis was marked by rising real interest rates, falling asset prices, overall financial instability that has led to a significant increase of the budget deficit and unemployment in Finland.