In the recent decades aggregate labor productivity in the U.S. became countercyclical (labor productivity puzzle). At the same time the U.S. experienced dramatic changes in the structure of households due to increased female labor force participation.

This study estimates the equivalence scale for Belarus, while directly accounting for household size economies of scale. For this purposes, the modication of methodology in Lancaster and Ray (1998) was used. The poverty levels for vulnerable social groups are estimated using the house holds equivalized total expenditures. In addition, the comparison of Engel curves for several expenditure categories is conducted for different years.

What affects individual preference for different types of political regime? Is it something individual or are there factors from outside that form preferences? This paper investigates the determinants of individual preferences for democratic values and looks at differences in impact of influencing factors in transition and non-transition countries.

Financial innovations are a common explanation for the rise in credit card debt and bankruptcies. To evaluate this story, the authors develop a simple model that incorporates two key frictions: asymmetric information about borrowers’ risk of default and a fixed cost of developing each contract lenders offer.

Belarus experienced rapid economic growth in the 2000's, which abruptly came to halt after 2008. The authors found that the major source of growth was capital accumulation, while growth in total factor productivity (TFP) was modest. Moreover, government interventions and controls on the capital market contributed to misallocation which lowered aggregate productivity. Lack of productivity growth led to the loss of competitiveness on the international markets. Comparisons of TFP in Belarus with the Czech Republic and Sweden shows that comparative advantages of Belarus are concentrated in the natural-resource based industries, and TFP gap with the Czech Republic is not closing over time.

The authors propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism.